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Abstract
Natural mimicry is ubiquitous. Plants mimic animals, animals mimic plants, animals
mimic each other and animals may even mimic counterfactual states that deceive or
distract other animals. Almost all natural mimicry is based on iconicity which hence
anchors it in real world resemblances. The vast majority of natural mimicry is done
unconsciously but when humans mimic, they know what they are doing. As Merlin
Donald suggest, mimicry may in fact have played a crucial role in the emergence of the
human condition, allowing new forms of cognition to emerge. Here it is suggested that
the role played by mimicry may have involved the evolution of a capacity for
metaphorical perception, where an object may not only be seen ‘as is’ but also ‘as if’
it was a functional mimic of something else. This new form of mimicry made possible
new forms of communication, co-operation and creative engagement with the environ-
ment. Once these developed to the point where they produced symbolic systems and
other cultural tools, the nature of human mimicry expanded radically. No longer
anchored in resemblance, it became detached and qualitatively distinct from natural
forms. The consequences of this detachment are now becoming clear.
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Introduction
Nature creates similarities. One need only think of mimicry. The highest
capacity for producing similarities, however, is man’s. His gift of seeing
resemblances is nothing other than a rudiment of the powerful compulsion in
former times to become and behave like something else. Perhaps there is
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none of his higher functions in which his mimetic faculty does not play a
decisive role. (Benjamin 1986, 333).
Walter Benjamin notes that mimicry is natural. In claiming that human beings have the
highest capacity for producing similarities he seems to give it an important role in
defining the human condition. But the human condition is not wholly natural. While it
has deep evolutionary roots which embed it in nature, the unique cultural setting in
which human being develop sets them apart from nature at the same time. Mimicry
played a key role in the emergence of this paradoxical state of existence and continues
to play a role in maintaining and developing it. What will be suggested here is part
of what this role might be, using a biosemiotic approach to mimicry and the notion of
affordance as put forward by James Gibson. These, in combination with theories of the
evolutionary and developmental origins of human cognition, will be used to examine
the relationship, or lack of it, between natural and human mimicry.
Human beings may have the highest capacity for mimicry, but there was mimicry
before there were human beings. The many examples that can be found in the plants
and animals now on earth are products of a history of mutual evolution that reaches
back to the Cambrian era and possibly before that. While the fossil record would not be
rich enough to show specific examples of mimicry such as those to be found in the
contemporary living world, the diversity of life forms found in it makes it reasonable
to suppose that mimicry existed once there was enough species diversity to support it.
The human capacity for mimicry must relate to that history in some way. But it is
overstating the case to say as Benjamin does that it emerged from B… the powerful
compulsion in former times to become and behave like something else.^. Put that way
it makes the human capacity for mimicry seem to be the outcome of a recognisable
psychological impulse. But, as many studies makes clear, mimicry can be seen in a
huge variety of organisms which are not sufficiently developed to have a Bcompulsion
… to become and behave like something else^. Yet mimicry is very clearly part of the
relationship between many species in the natural world from which the human condi-
tion will have evolved (e.g. Wickler 1965; Pasteur 1982; Maran 2017). So, while this
paper will end by considering how mimicry relates to the human condition, it will begin
by briefly looking at mimicry in the natural, that is, pre-human, world.
Natural Mimicry
Definitions of mimicry are many and various. The term appears in the research
literature on topics that range from molecular chemistry through physiology, psychol-
ogy and cultural history. Clearly, the term is too inclusive to be of much use on its own.
Introducing some constraints in order to frame a more refined and exact definition
seems needed.
A more developed definition of mimicry found in the Oxford English dictionary is:
BThe action, practice, or art of mimicking or closely imitating, in sport or otherwise, the
manner, gesture, speech, or mode of actions and persons, or the superficial character-
istics of a thing.^ This does well to describe what satirical impersonators of politicians
do, to use a somewhat odd example. This is clearly mimicry with a particular place in
culture. But the definition won’t do at the molecular level. Biochemical events are not
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in the same class of things as intentional actions within the complex web of human
affairs. To refer to them with the same term would be a category error.
Perhaps it might be more productive to define mimicry in terms of cause and effect.
When sympathomimetic drugs are used to de-constrict the airways of asthmatics, they
are said to mimic the physiological action of adrenaline. Here the link between cause
and effect is fairly direct. It could be traced by investigating the biochemical processes
involved, since the molecular structure of the drug resembles that of adrenaline it can
have the same effects on the body. Therein lies the mimicry. But this won’t do to
describe, say the satirical mimicry of politicians; this is the category error. Mimicry of
this latter sort is intended to amuse and whether it does has to do with the complexities
of political culture at a particular moment and an indefinite number of other social and
psychological factors.
Moreover, in the human case it is far more difficult to trace cause and effect links
because mimicry can take so many forms and has an indefinite number of purposes.
Someone who mimics a politician does not expect that their audience will think that
they actually are that person. But when a poker player with a strong hand wants other
players to think she has a weak one she may mimic what she does when she really does
have a weak hand. She wants her mimicry to cause a mistaken state of mind in the other
players. Whether that cause and effect link is made will, again, depend on the
personalities involved, the history of the game up to that point and many other factors
in and around the situation.
These examples highlight the layers of interpersonal interpretation that can accom-
pany mimicry in the human world. But avoiding these complex and volatile factors,
perhaps mimicry in the natural world of animals and plants might be easier to explain in
cause and effect terms. But this won’t cover the wide variety of mimicry to be found
there either. When a Killdeer plover behaves as if it had a wounded wing the effect may
be to distract a predator away from a nest, but the biochemical processes involved will
be at best secondary explanations for what is going on. The primary explanation of the
link between cause and effect will have to do with the co-evolution of prey-predator
relationships. It also raises quite fundamental questions about just how intentional
animal actions are, the question in this case being whether the plover has the intention
to deceive the predator. The poker player above had a clear idea about what she wanted
to achieve; it seems unlikely that the plover has an imagined outcome in mind, yet her
actions appear highly intentional and in somewhat the same way.
Deception or, more precisely, the intention to deceive, is relevant here in considering
the boundary between human and non-human psychology. For example, it is crucially
involved in what has become known as Machiavellian Intelligence, which is the
capacity to aim for outcomes that depend on some degree of insight into the mental
lives of conspecifics (Byrne and Whiten 1988). Whiten and Byrne give a number of
examples of animals, nearly always apes or monkeys, emitting false distress cries to
gain some tactical advantage in a social situation. In one case a young baboon emitted
the sort of cry it would emit if in danger, apparently to attract its mother whose
approach would scare off a competitor for some food. Whether this was as intentional
as it might appear to a human observer, it is possible that there is some analogy here to
the poker player. Certainly there are more grounds for thinking so in this case than in
that of the plover. While this is not mimicry per se, it is very close to it, and it is closely
bound up with the attribution of intentionality which, as will be touched on below, is
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important when considering what distinguishes mimicry in humans from that in the
natural world.
When considering animals as complex as birds and apes it is quite easy to maintain
what the philosopher of cognitive science Daniel Dennett calls the Bintentional stance^
(Dennett 1989). This is to regard the actions of people and other animals, as being
motivated and guided by mental states such as desires, beliefs and intentions. Even
though human beings can’t know it directly it is easy to accept that plovers and apes
have some subjective psychological life, that it’s Blike something to be them^ as Thomas
Nagel puts it (Nagel 1974). Human beings know from first-hand experience what it is
like to have an intention, which is what makes the case of the poker player understand-
able. In the case of the young baboon it is perhaps possible to believe that they have
something like the intentions a person might have. But the behaviour of the plover is
much more stereotyped and fixed to given circumstances and thus it seems less likely in
this case. Overall, it is clear that attributing human-like states of mind to animals is best
done in the context of careful experimental investigation (e.g. Raby et al. 2007).
Many striking instances of mimicry can be found in simpler organisms like insects
and plants where taking the intentional stance seems inappropriate. For example, many
insects have bodies that resemble leaves or other parts of plants, which hence camou-
flage them from predators or from prey. It would seem a little bizarre to propose that they
‘intend’ to hide themselves. They do not behave or assume an appearance ‘in order’ to
hide, they have no choice in the matter. That their bodies have the extraordinarily plant-
like appearance that they do is a result of their co-evolution with other insects and plants.
Their behaviour will also have evolved in tandem with their morphology. For an insect
not to look like what it is but like a twig it is best to keep very still (e.g. Robinson 1981).
Plants too can have characteristics that are not what they seem. The flowers of the
hammer orchid, Drakaea livida, not only mimic the shape of female Thynnine wasps
but also emit an odour that mimics the mating pheromone they emit. (Gasket et al.
2017) Male wasps are deceived into attempting to mate with the flower and thereby
pollinate it. In this striking example of mutual evolution it’s not so hard to imagine that
the wasps have some degree of intentionality, but much harder to think that the orchid is
‘intending’ anything when it deceives a wasp. Here, we are clearly a long conceptual
way from the strategic deception of the poker player.
Even this tiny fraction of the great many instances of mimicry found in the natural
world shows how diverse they are. The point in providing these examples is to show
that despite the diversity, what is almost always the case in natural mimicry is that is
based on real world resemblances. This will provide a central contrast to the treatment
of different types on mimicry below. But in respect of natural mimicry, biologists,
naturalists and others have ordered its diversity into a natural history (e.g. Pasteur 1982)
or by using concepts from communication and information theory, both with some
success (e.g. Wickler 1965). However, a biosemiotic approach seems particularly suited
to doing this (e.g. Maran 2017).
A Biosemotic Perspective on Mimicry
The nomenclature of semiotics allows the field of mimicry to be structured to provide a
more inclusive, ordered natural history. In the cases noted above, the leaf mimicry of
Pickering J.
insects and the wasp mimicry of orchids are instances of iconicity, while the orchid’s
emission of a pheromone-like odour is perhaps more indexical. Much as the notion of
smoke being an index of fire, so the odour of a flower is an index of the nectar it affords.
Peirce’s semiotic triad is a flexible framework into which it’s possible to fit the
baboon and plover examples. The triadic framework could also accommodate the poker
player and the impersonators, but there the relationship between sign object and
interpretant is vastly more complex. What makes it so is the human capacity for
reflexive consciousness combined with metaphorical cognition, which will be touched
on in the next section.
In the natural world, however, it is clear that the power of a biosemiotic approach is
that it treats the natural forms of mimicry as meaning based. This is far more productive
and realistic than trying to describe it, and the wider field of interaction between
organisms and their niches, in abstract and reductive terms, such as the exchange of
information, the development of stimulus - response habits or even to mere physiology.
Biosemotics is a rich blend of biological science, especially ethology, Peircian
semiotics and owes much to Jacob von Uexküll’s approach to living processes, which
was fundamentally meaning based. Strongly influenced by the Naturphilosophie of
Hegel and Schelling, von Uexküll took evolutionary change to be the progressive
unfolding of organic plans rather than the accumulation of useful accidents. Ecologies
in his view were integrated systems of living things, harmoniously interacting with one
another on the basis of meaning. Indeed, for von Uexküll life itself was based on
meaning: B… life can only be understood when one has acknowledged the importance
of meaning.^ (von Uexküll 1982b). A biosemiotic approach brings Peirce and von
Uexküll together to offer a picture of the organic world as perfused, and hence
structured, by signs, that is, by the exchange of of meanings (Hoffmeyer 2009;
Romanini and Eliseo Fernandez 2014; von Uexküll 1982a).
Here it is well to remember that ‘meaning’ has a dual character, namely, what the
world ‘means’ to the organism and what organisms ‘means’ to do in acting towards the
world. This dual character is what makes the biosemiotic approach ideal for describing
the how mimicry is an aspect of the interrelatedness of living systems, thus: BIn
semiotic relations, different organisms are bound together through perception, recog-
nition, communication and action, and it is in this layer that the organism’s interpreta-
tion starts shaping the future stages of the mimicry system.^ (Maran 2017, 117).
A biosemiotic approach also addresses the question of what drives and directs
evolution. Rather than appealing to immaterial forces such as Bergson’s elan vital or
to mystical final causes like Teilhard de Chardin’s Omega Point, a biosemiotic ap-
proach suggests that progressive evolutionary change is in the direction of what
Hoffmeyer calls semiotic freedom (Hoffmeyer 2010). This direction is towards states
in which organisms can interpret a wider range of signs, and have greater flexibility in
the interpretation of those signs. BSelection would in fact be expected to favour the
evolution of more sophisticated forms of semiotic freedom in the sense of an increased
capacity for responding to a variety of signs^ (Hoffmeyer 2010, 9). This increase in
capacity is perhaps the same as a move from ‘closed’ to ‘open’ evolutionary strategies,
to use the distinction put forward by Ernst Mayr (Mayr 1974). By ‘open’ Mayr meant
animals that were adaptable and able to learn while by ‘closed’ he mean animals that
were more reliant on instinctual habits, making Hoffmeyer’s trajectory towards sophis-
tication a move towards open strategies.
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In summary, biosemiotics not only offers a comprehensive theoretical vocabulary for
ordering the huge field of natural mimicry but also a way to understand the direction of
evolutionary change. The question might then be asked, does this direction point
towards the human condition, with the more complex forms of mimicry that can be
found in it? Here it will be suggested that it does not. Not, at least, in itself. However,
the clarity the biosemiotic approach gives to the issue of mimicry helps to prepare the
way for an explanation, as it were. In the next section some biosemiotic ideas will be
used, in conjunction with others from the work of Merlin Donald, Michael Tomasello
and James Gibson, to suggest a role, or roles, for mimicry in the human condition. Not
all of these roles are natural and this is why human mimicry is fundamentally different
from that found in the pre-human world.
Un-Natural Mimicry
Both animals and human beings are conscious, but only human being know that they
are. Reflexive awareness is an evolutionary anomaly that has had profound conse-
quences. Together with other cognitive resources that also appear to be more or less a
human monopoly, it has ushered in the era of cultural evolution. The history of this era
is the subject of a vast research literature and although it changes as new discoveries are
made, some features and their dates are fairly well established.
Tool making of a higher order than that found in the animal world appeared around
two million years ago, while controlled use fire seems to have been established around
a half million years ago, and farming about ten thousand years ago. This progressive
increase in the cultural scaffolding supporting human existence will have been accom-
panied by, and made possible by, the parallel development of a set of cognitive and
communicative resources, eventually including language.
In his sweeping survey of the cognitive history of human beings, Jeremy Lent gives
significant coverage to Merlin Donald’s notion of mimesis, (Donald 1993), which will
be outlined below. In his chapter 1, which Lent entitles ‘How we became Human.’, he
quotes Donald’s observation that mimesis B… underlies all modern cultures and forms
the most basic medium of human communication.^ (Lent 2017, 40). He also cites it as a
crucial factor in the development of co-operative cultural patterns that allowed human
groups to grow in size and to survive more effectively in their environment. This is an
issue to which we shall return at the end of this paper. In subsequent chapters Lent
carefully traces out the various cultural advances made by human beings to shows how
they may have produced, from the relative cultural homogeneity which probably
marked early humans, the great diversity of human cultures that have existed in the
more recent past and that have persisted into the present.
Yuval Harari also presents a far-reaching account of human history and, like Lent,
emphasises the role of co-operation in the success of early human beings (Harari 2011,
52). While he goes somewhat deeper than Lent into the origins of Homo sapiens, he
also emphasises cognitive and social abilities rather than physical characteristics.
Although he does not deal with mimicry explicitly, like Donald, he places great
importance on the development of new cognitive resources as a major factor in the
spread of early humans. These resources will have been deployed to meet the chal-
lenges of a hunter-gather lifestyle more effectively. Significantly, studies of such
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societies show that they foster a deep appreciation of the natural world, seen as an
interdependent web of living beings, and the place of human beings in it (e.g. McLuhan
1994, chapter 6); this is another issue that will be considered at the end of this paper.
As Donald suggests, these new cognitive resources will also have allowed early
humans to monitor their own actions, to act collectively and to share skills to a degree
not possible for other species (Donald 1993). This would certainly have meant a move
towards B… more sophisticated forms of semiotic freedom …^ to use Hoffmeyer’s
surmise about the direction of evolutionary change. But, crucially, these more sophis-
ticated signs will have gradually become detached from those of the natural world. The
development of the human mind created a new sign domain with qualities not found in
the pre-human domain. While this domain clearly includes the cultural signs dealt with
by much of semiotics in general, these must have had evolutionary forebears. This is
something to which less attention is paid; there is little about evolution to be found in
the work of Lotman or Barthes for example.
In a somewhat complementary sense, there’s virtually nothing about semiotics in
Donald’s influential account of the evolution of the human mind. It nonetheless gives a
central place to mimicry and takes advanced cultural signs, including language, to be
relatively late evolutionary developments. Donald suggests a three-stage evolutionary
sequence for the appearance of the cognitive resources that together make the human
case special. The sequence, in extremely compressed form, is from the development of
the paired capacities for autonomous episodic recall and mimesis, through a process of
lexicalisation to the externalisation of collective cultural symbols.
First in the sequence is the development of a capacity for self-cued, that is,
autonomous recall from episodic memory allied with the ability to mimic what is
recalled through actions of the whole body. Donald suggests this may appeared in the
human line even as early as two million years before the present and well before the
appearance of language. It supports the idea that B… human intelligence without
language has properties that set it apart from ape intelligence …^ (Donald 1993, 93).
Being able to recall and re-enact at will the actions involved in, say, tool use, allowed
those actions to be practiced and improved. Being able to recall and re-enact episodes
of collective action also meant that proto humans could communicate about them and
perhaps plan further actions. It is this form of mimicry that Donald calls mimesis.
Mimesis allowed for a vastly more enriched social life than even than the highly
developed forms seen in apes and cetaceans. Mimesis is a highly developed form of
mimicry that goes well beyond the mere reproduction of appearance. By comparison
with natural mimicry it is more open, that is, less tied to particular circumstances. It is
also strongly linked to the development of a specifically human capacity for referring to
objects or events not actually present. This is why Donald suggests it as a precursor to
language, and proposes that as communication developed, particular repeated acts of
mimesis became ritualised into known and shared particulars, which is what Donald
refers to as lexicalisation. Finally the lexicon becomes the basis for language and this in
turn opened the way to the externalisation of shared cultural experience in the form of
words and the multitude of symbol systems like writing and numbers.
In this highly abbreviated account, mimicry, or a particularly distinctive develop-
ment of it, plays a central role in the emergence of the human condition. Rather than
mimicry as mere reproduction of resemblance, what appeared in the human case is
what Donald distinguishes as mimesis. Mimesis is a self-generated type of mimicry
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used to elaborate individual memories and skills as well as to communicate with
conspecifics. Lying thus at the heart of what it is to be human, it persists to the present
day. As Donald puts it: BIf mimesis was the adaptation that generated a distinctively
human culture, it follows that the deepest communicative framework of human culture
must still be mimetic.^ (Donald 2005, 293). What we notice here is that mimesis is not
the accidental production and preservation of resemblance that characterises mimicry in
the world of animals and plants. Rather it is and was a purposive mental act by self-
aware humans and, presumably, proto-humans. The purposes involved are open ended
and potentially creative. Mimesis might be the repetition of the actions involved in
making tools or building structures. It’s purpose, apart from actually producing tools or
structures, might be to vary the actions in order to see how they might be more
effective. It might also have been used to demonstrate actions to others, or to refer to
actions in the past or even to actions planned for the future.
For mimesis to work as a means of communication in this way, observers of mimetic
acts must be able to understand the intentions of the mime. Crucially they need to
recognise that the actions need to be seen as representing something. This capacity to
see something not ‘as it is’ but ‘as if it were something else’ is a sort of metaphorical
perception that is so rare within the world of animals that it is effectively a human
monopoly. Evidence of something like metaphorical perception can be found in apes.
For example, Kohlers’ classic studies of chimpanzees showed that objects like packing
cases could be ‘seen as’ something like a ladder to be used to grasp something out of
reach (Kohler 1925). However, that capacity was limited and highly dependent on
circumstances. Human mimicry is not limited to anything like the same degree.
What Donald proposes is a far more powerful cognitive capacity that moves cogni-
tion over a qualitative boundary. It is a type of communication through mimesis, which,
in Peircian terms, involves the elective use of signs whose objects may be distant in time
and space. The purpose of the communicator is to create a specific interpretant in the
communicatee. For example a proto-human, in acting out the gathering and eating of
fruit, might have been intending to co-opt others to help in doing that task. The
assumption on the part of the actor being that the conspecifics at whom the mimicry
was directed would to be able to understand it as communicative and to ‘get the
message’ as it were. It is this capacity for metaphorical action and perception that makes
this early form of mimicry critically distinct from the diverse examples found in the pre-
human world. It lies very close to the origins of human cognition.
Michael Tomasello points out that the extremely rapid evolution of human cognition
is a puzzle, since biological evolution does not bring about change so quickly
(Tomasello 1999). His solution to it is B… that the amazing suite of cognitive skills
and products displayed by modern humans is the result of some sort of species-unique
mode or modes of cultural transmission.^ (Tomasello 1999, chapter 1). What Donald’s
account provides is the mimetic key to how this mode of cultural transmission may
have begun. That account also requires a number of other proto human cognitive
resources to have become linked and to have facilitated each other. Here we have
suggested that in addition to mimesis there needed to have been a capacity for
metaphorical perception and action.
Another capacity which also appears to be unique to humans is that unlike apes
BHumans understand the behaviour of others as intentional goal-directed action.^
(Tomasello and Carpenter 2005, 133). Being able to understand conspecifics in terms
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of what they intend to do is a powerful means to develop levels of social integration that
would be impossible in species lacking that ability. Others evolutionists have also noted
the rapid evolution of human cognition and concluded that it will have had much to do
with selective pressures that gave advantage to social intelligence that allowed early
human to co-operate more fully and so develop more complex forms of social organi-
sation than those found in the animal world (e.g. Byrne andWhiten 1988; Dunbar 2015).
As Tomasello suggests, an important part of social intelligence is the ability to relate
to other human beings through understanding their intentions. But this in turn requires
that they are recognised to be intentional in ways that can be related to what we know
about being intentional through first person experience. We may even extend that
knowledge to make intentional attributions to other species. We easily adopt the
intentional stance towards dogs, since they have been bred to be understandable in
that way. It is less easy to adopt it towards other species and there may in any case be
strong limitations to what we can know about the mental lives of other species,
according to Nagel (Nagel 1974).
Some degree of an intentional stance towards conspecifics may be an evolutionary
advantage (Humphrey 1980). There is some evidence for it in other species, but human
beings are exceptionally skilled intention readers. The work of Meltzoff and colleagues
have shown that the preconditions for that skill can even be observed in newborns, who
appear to mimic the actions, particularly the expressions, of other human beings
(Meltzoff and Moore 1977, 1993). From this Meltzoff has developed what he calls
the BLike Me^ hypothesis (Meltzoff 2005, 2006). This is the idea that that newborns
not only mimic expressions and actions but also experience the link between their own
actions and their own states of mind. This in turn provides them with what is now often
referred to as a BTheory of Mind^, that is, the attribution of states of mind to others.
Although the imitation by newborns is unconscious it is the gateway to higher more
consciously intentional forms, including mimicry. These higher forms are part of the
sophisticated social intelligence that must have been a crucial element in the rapid
evolutionary appearance of human cognition, as Meltzoff puts it: BImitation evolved
through Darwinian means but achieves Lamarckian ends.^ (Meltzoff 2005, 55).
In the BLike Me^ hypothesis, imitation is more or less literal. What is being
proposed here is also a slightly more developed form of imitation based on a capacity
for metaphor. It was probably among B… that the amazing suite of cognitive skills and
products displayed by modern humans is the result of some sort of species-unique
mode or modes of cultural transmission.^ suggested by Tomasello as the reason why
human cognition evolved so quickly. Although metaphor as now encountered in human
cultures is highly culture-bound, it’s origins might well lie in the more direct, pre
cultural perception and action systems that fit animals into their niches. For von
Uexküll and other biosemioticians these systems are based on the exchange of signs
and meaningful actions.
For James Gibson and others in what is known as the tradition of ecological
psychology, or direct perception, the fit between active perceivers and their environ-
ments is based on what he termed affordance. Gibson defines it thus:
There is information in the light to specify affordances .... this radical hypothesis
implies that the value and meaning of things can be directly perceived. The
affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal .... either for good or
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ill. By affordance I mean something that implies the complementarity of the animal
and the environment. The notion that invariants are related at one extreme to the
motives and needs of an observer and at the other extreme to the substances and
surfaces of a world provides a new approach to psychology^ (Gibson 1979, 179).
Gibson’s aims in putting forward this idea in the 1970’s was to offer an alternative to
the information processing approach which at that time was dominating the psychology
of perception and action. In something like the pragmatist spirit of Peirce, Dewey and
others, Gibson was skeptical about treating the mind as if it were the holder of
representations of the world from which active organisms could work out how to act.
This approach meant that the link between perception and action was indirect, via a
process of inference or computation. Instead, Gibson suggested that psychologists
needed to look more carefully at how the world presents itself to the senses rather than
to invent possible internal structures that represented it. As one of Gibson’s colleagues
put it BDon’t ask what’s inside your head, ask what your head’s inside of.^ (Mace
1977). Gibson’s view was that looked at in the right way, it would be clear that there
was invariant structure in the ambient arrays of sensory energy that could directly guide
action. For Gibson affordance was among the most important of these guides.
Gibson’s theory of affordance provides a psychological counterpart to von Uexküll’s
bio-semiotics. It deals with B ... the reciprocity that has evolved between living systems
and their environments ... especially the transactions between them related to perceiv-
ing and the execution of purposes.^ (Gibson 1979, 170). It owes much to the pragmatist
approach to perception, which is that every perceived thing is perceived as a means to a
possible end. Viewed in this light, perception is both for action and an action in itself.
What is perceived is what may be done. Accordingly, affordance, means the perception
of what opportunities for action exist in the immediate environment of a particular
organism. Such signs do not have to be emitted by other organisms, though they may
be, but can also be emitted, or ‘broadcast’ by objects and events, to borrow another
term from Gibson. Thus the environment furnishes not meaning-free stimuli but rather
a structured set of signals indicating what can be done. In short, affordances are signs
(Pickering 2007).
Affordances are part of natural systems of signs which designate the behavioural
meanings of the environment for particular organisms. An organism is attuned to
perceive where, when and how it’s environment offers it the opportunity to do what
it is adapted to do. Affordances are the psychological part of this attunement. They are
not Bin the environment^ and Bdetected by^ the animal, nor are they Bin the animal^
and Bprojected onto^ the environment. Rather, affordances emerge with mutually
evolved relationships within ecosystems.
In Peirce’s tripartite classification of signs, affordances appear to be for the most part
indexical in that they bear a direct and necessary connection to their denotation. In this
sense affordance indicates exactly what actions are possible in a given situation or, more
specifically, what can be done with or to an object. The object is perceived literally, ‘as
is’. But it is here that metaphor may have had it’s evolutionary origins. Early hominids
will have been able to engage with the world on the basis of literal affordance as just
defined. But what may have opened the way to a richer more creative engagement could
have been the appearance to the capacity to engage with the world on a metaphorical
basis, that is, on the basis of perceiving it ‘as if’ it were other than it was.
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Take the example of a stone. It’s literal affordances to an early hominid would
include throwing, lifting, pounding and an indefinite range of other actions depending
on it’s size, shape and so on. But the same stone might afford an even greater range if
modified in some way such as by chipping off flakes or to create a saw-like serrated
edge, or by using the flakes themselves as knife-like tools. The crucial step needed for
this to be possible would have been to go beyond perceiving the stone ‘as is’ to
perceiving it ‘as if’ it were something else. While the ‘something else’ in this example
would be closely related to the original condition of the stone, once this metaphorical
capacity was found to be useful, it might well generalise, to other objects, either singly
or in combination. The affordances of stick perceived ‘as is’ will be will be transformed
by perceiving it ‘as if’ it were lashed to another stick or furnished with a stone flake tip.
The creative transformation of objects into useful tools is a variety of functional
mimicry. A rock perceived ‘as if’ it were a fist is a hammer. A stone flake perceived ‘as
if’ it were a particularly hard and sharp fingernail is a scraper. A lump of clay perceived
‘as if’ it had been shaped into something like a pair of cupped hands is a container. And
so on; although these examples are of relatively primitive actions, it is quite possible
that the foundations for a more developed metaphorical form of mimicry lie here. Once
it had appeared it would be available to the mimetic processes sketched by Donald
where reflexivity and the ability to demonstrate purposive actions to conspecifics
would have rapidly elaborated it, though of course ‘rapidly’ here is used in terms of
evolutionary timescales. This elaboration could have developed to a significant
degree prior to the use of language. Anthropological studies of the cultural
transmission of skills, such as those for making tools and other cultural artefacts,
show that much of it depends heavily on imitation and observational learning (e.g.
Ingold 2000). It does not need language or other symbolic systems, although these
are clearly central to other types of cultural transmission. Likewise developmental
studies have shown how much interpersonal communication can occur prior to the
development of language (e.g. Lock 1978).
Given that a capacity for metaphorical perception and action is closely related to
mimesis, this would mean that it appeared in the first of Donald’s stages in the
origination of the modern mind. During the subsequent stages of lexicalisation and
externalisation it will have developed to become incorporated in B… deepest commu-
nicative framework of human culture … Bas he puts it. Claims have been made for
metaphor as the basis of much thought and language (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 2003).
Metaphor aside, human mimicry is as varied as it is in the natural world. But, unlike
the natural world, human mimicry is often consciously produced and can often rely on
culturally agreed understandings, as in the case of satirical impersonators. Mimicry in
the natural world is often a means of deception or concealment. This can also be true in
the human case, like the poker player, but the reflexivity and the unique human capacity
for metaphor makes it into something qualitatively different.
Detached Mimicry
A great amount of time separates the appearance of mimicry in the natural world from
it’s appearance in the human domain. Moreover, there are significant qualitative
differences between these types of mimicry. Human beings may have the highest
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capacity for mimicry as Benjamin said, but it seems unlikely that that capacity arises
from what he called the B… powerful compulsion in former times to become and
behave like something else.^What has been suggested here is that it might be nearer the
truth to propose that it originally arose from the compulsion to make an object become
something else. Thus ‘highest’ should be taken to mean ‘most flexible and productive’.
However, Benjamin may be right to suggest that in humans Bthere is none of his
higher functions in which his mimetic faculty does not play a decisive role.^ This is
because mimicry lies close to the origins of the human condition and continues to be a
part of human development. Once mimicry had developed it will have helped bring the
world of symbolic culture into existence, where its roles became prodigiously enlarged,
diversified and qualitatively distinct from natural forms of mimicry. It is in this sense
that mimicry remains important in maintaining and developing the human condition.
Words and other symbol systems have generated a recursive web of signs within which
mimicry creates structures and practices that, having become detached from the natural
world, cease to have any strong or fixed relation to it.
In his semiotic analysis of recent cultural history, Jean Baudrillard traces and extends
this detachment (Baudrillard 1993). In what he terms the BEmancipation of the Sign^,
he shows how detachment allows signs to become autonomous: BThe emancipation of
the sign: remove this ‘archaic’ obligation to designate something, and it finally
becomes free …^ (Baudrillard 1993, 7). With this freedom signs can mimic anything
and hence become mobile and autonomous, producing a vertiginous condition where
the signifier floats free from the signified. In this condition chains of mimicry detach
from their origin and produce successive phases of what Baudrillard calls simulacra.
The production of simulacra can be seen as extending what Donald called mimesis to
the point where what is being imitated is itself an imitation. Although this process is
mediated by human agency, Baudrillard seems at times to suggest that it can become
autonomous. An example might be the way a computer-enhanced image of a celebrity
is so widely distributed in social media that it becomes the ‘real’ thing. Thus a
simulacrum means an imitation which, having lost direct connection to what was
originally simulated, then becomes treated as reality (Baudrillard 1983).
Two examples from popular culture can illustrate this condition. The first is the
artwork on the sleeve of a CD released in 1998 with the title ‘Twilight of the Gods: The
Essential Wagner Collection.’. The CD offered twenty seven excerpts from Wagner’s
operas, so it might be expected that the artwork would reflect the mythical and religious
themes found in Wagner’s oeuvre. In fact, the sleeve was made to look as if it was a
frame cut from a reel of movie film, with sprocket holes down the sides. In the frame
was a sinister descending echelon of military helicopters set against a flaming sun. The
explanation for this lies in the first track on the CD which was the leitmotif from Die
Walküre, usually called BThe Ride of the Valkyries^. This had featured in the 1979 film
Apocalypse Now to accompany a helicopter attack on a Vietnamese village. With the
success of the film in the intervening years the link between the music and helicopters
had become automatic and buyers of the CD knew why the sleeve looked the way it
did. Although the chains of simulacra here are part of complex mimetic web they are
nonetheless easily understood by anyone with the right background.
The second example is the Fez, a red tasseled cap often worn by men in Muslim
countries. A British comedian called Tommy Cooper wore one in his act and much of
his appeal lay in the comic effect of the Fez and his catch phrase BJust like that^ which
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he’d say while making particular hand gestures. Although Cooper died in 1984, tourists
still encounter men who, when trying to sell them a Fez, make Cooper’s gestures and
say BJust like that^. The sellers do this because originally so many tourists who bought
a Fez would then mimic Cooper’s act to their friends. Now, the Fez sellers and their
customers preserve Cooper’s act without knowing what they are doing.
Baudrillard’s treatment of mimicry goes far beyond such examples, but the point
being made is that same. It is that mimicry in the human world has become autono-
mous, mobile and totally detached from its origins. It creates a realm of conventional
signs that are in some sense false as they lack the iconic attachment to the real world
found in natural mimicry. The signs that support natural mimicry are grounded in the
semiotic web of mutual evolution. Even though that web contains what might be called
false signs, as when a flower resembles a wasp or an insect resembles leaf, that falsity is
still iconic and hence grounded in the real world. The signs that mediate human
mimicry, by crucial contrast, even if they too are iconic can be totally ungrounded.
This radical disconnection between signs and what they signify is part of what makes it
qualitative distinct from natural mimicry. The result, as one commentator has put it, is
that BSymbolic culture is a realm of patently false signals.^ (Knight 2010, 193).
But the falsity here is not of the same sort as, say, the false eye spots on the tail fin of
a butterfly fish, which are aids for survival. It is the intrinsic falsity that arises when
human beings reflexively manipulate signs. While there is some degree of falsity in the
animal world that approaches the symbolic level, it is not based on reflexivity. Gregory
Bateson noted how the playful fighting of young dogs, was in some sense an example
of falsity in that the manner of their biting enacts the statement BThis bite is not a bite^
(Bateson 1978). But when René Magritte produced a painting of a pipe and then added
BCeci n’est pas une pipe^ to it, a totally different form of reflexive falsification was
being enacted.
John Deely offers this capacity for reflexive engagement with signs as a replacement
for the Cartesian res cogitans as a definition of what it is to be human (Deely 2010).
But the human condition has arisen within the natural world which, according to Peirce
perfused with signs. Indeed, Peirce claimed that there is something like thought and
sentience to be found at all levels of the cosmos: BThought is not necessarily connected
with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely
physical world ... But ... there cannot be thought without signs^ (Peirce 1991, 252). But
brains have evolved and Peirce, like Hoffmeyer, would most likely have seen evolution
as the progressive emergence of more developed forms of semiotic order.
As was noted at the beginning of this paper, reflexive consciousness, that is, the
awareness of awareness itself, creates a unique space within this order. Deely desig-
nates this to be the location of the human condition, characterised by a capacity for
reflexivity: BWhat distinguishes the human being among the animals is quite simple…
only human animals come to realise that there are signs distinct from and superordinate
to every particular thing ….^ (Deely 2010, 10).
Conclusion
What has been sketched here is what may have happened during human cultural
evolution that has bought human beings to this realisation. Benjamin attributed a
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capacity for mimicry to B… a compulsion in former times to become and behave like
something else.^ While this is close to Donald’s ideas about mimesis, a step has been
missed. The step is supplied by the proposal put forward here, namely, that part of the
evolutionary transition from the pre-human to the human world was the development of
the ability to go beyond seeing an object it ‘as is’ in order to see it, in pre-figuration, ‘as
if’ it were, or could be if transformed, something else. In terms borrowed from Gibson’s
ecological approach to perception and action this would have meant transforming the
affordances of the object from what they were initially to affordances that functionally
mimic those of something else. Based on Donald’s ideas, it has been proposed that this
capacity arises from more mundane compulsions to co-operate, communicate and
survive by making things and sharing the skills involved.
Although the proposal relies heavily on ideas already put forward by Gibson,
Donald and others what is perhaps novel in it is the role given to metaphorical
perception and action, where ‘metaphorical’ means a form of functional mimicry. In
perceptual terms this means seeing objects ‘as if’ they were, or could be made into,
something else that mimics some desired functional affordance. In terms of action, it
means the sort of communicative use of mimicry that Donald places close to the origins
and persisting identities of human beings.
Jean Baudrillard and Wendy Wheeler among many others, show how pre-human
signs at the physical and biological levels of existence have been progressively
enhanced by those of human culture (Wheeler 2006, 2016; Baudrillard 1983).
Wheeler in particular provides a powerful account of the role of technology in creating
a new context for the human condition (Wheeler 2016, chapter 6). Within this context
qualitatively new forms of signification have emerged that render human mimicry
distinct from that in the pre-human world.
These forms have progressively detached the human condition from the natural world
and, to return to issues raised above, it is important to note how this detachment has made
a significant break with the encounter with the natural world characteristic of societies,
such as those of hunter-gatherers, where technology is relatively simple. Such societies
foster an image of the natural world as an interdependent web of meaning. From this
image there comes a form of ecological intelligence or sensitivity based in an awareness
of the interdependence of all forms of life, including that of human beings (e.g. Lent
2017, 32; McLuhan 1994, chapter 6). The loss of this awareness has had consequences
that are now all too clear as the damage being done to the living systems of the earth by
consumptive technology becomes more and more apparent (Lent 2017, chapter 20).
In meeting these consequences, which is the dominating geopolitical issue of our
era, biosemiotics can, and perhaps should, have a unique role to play. Among the
sciences it is ideally placed to account for how the natural and cultural worlds inter-
relate. Moreover, it is also ideally suited to benefit from the radical changes to the
philosophical basis of biological sciences that are presently being put forward. Broadly,
these changes lead away from the mechanistic metaphysics and reductive methodology
that linger on from the nineteenth century and towards a worldview in which systems,
relations and processes are taken as ontologically fundamental (e.g. Dupré and
Nicholson 2018; Noble 2016). It is implicit in this worldview that BEcological inter-
dependence… is one of the most characteristic aspects of the living world… B(Dupré
and Nicholson 2018, 20) and that the hierarchy of systems that compose reality exist in
B… reciprocal dependency … B(op. cit., 3). Such a worldview reveals the anomalous
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nature of the detachment sketched in the previous section. What Baudrillard terms the
‘emancipation of the sign’, the removal of the obligation to designate anything real, is
an escape from the reciprocal dependency of the living world. Of course, not all the
sign systems of human cultures are ‘emancipated’ in this sense. There are in fact
immensely powerful and have provided human beings with remarkable levels of
control over the natural world. But with that can come a dangerous loss of awareness
of the impacts of human action.
It is to be hoped that the changes to the basis of the scientific worldview noted above
will go some way to remedy this loss. They are not, of themselves, sufficient to re-
create the ecological intelligence of previous eras, and it is obviously impossible, for
example, to return to hunter-gatherer lifestyles. However, they may well play a
necessary role in the reshaping of our worldview that is so urgently needed to address
the environmental problems we now face.
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